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Abstract State-of-the-art risk equalization models under-
compensate some risk groups and overcompensate others,
leaving systematic incentives for risk selection. A natural
approach to reducing the under- or overcompensation for a
particular group is enriching the risk equalization model
with risk adjustor variables that indicate membership in
that group. For some groups, however, appropriate risk
adjustor variables may not (yet) be available. For these
situations, this paper proposes an alternative approach to
reducing under- or overcompensation: constraining the
estimated coefficients of the risk equalization model such
that the under- or overcompensation for a group of interest
equals a fixed amount. We show that, compared to ordinary
least-squares, constrained regressions can reduce under/
overcompensation for some groups but increase under/
overcompensation for others. In order to quantify this
trade-off two fundamental questions need to be answered:
‘‘Which groups are relevant in terms of risk selection
actions?’’ and ‘‘What is the relative importance of under-
and overcompensation for these groups?’’ By making
assumptions on these aspects we empirically evaluate a
particular set of constraints using individual-level data
from the Netherlands (N = 16.5 million). We find that the
benefits of introducing constraints in terms of reduced
under/overcompensations for some groups can be worth the
costs in terms of increased under/overcompensations for
others. Constrained regressions add a tool for developing
risk equalization models that can improve the overall
economic performance of health plan payment schemes.
Keywords Health insurance  Risk equalization 
Capitation  Risk selection  Constrained regression
JEL Classification I11  I13  G22
Introduction
Several countries have adopted elements of Alain Entho-
ven’s model of regulated health plan competition [10]
which combines affordability of health plans with incen-
tives for cost containment and quality improvement.1 A
crucial element of Enthoven’s model is the adjustment of
health plan payments to predictable variation in medical
spending, also referred to as risk equalization (RE). In the
absence of premium regulation, RE mitigates incentives for
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1 By ‘‘health plan competition’’ we mean competition among health
insurers who offer one or multiple health plans. A ‘‘health plan’’
refers to a health insurance product. All consumers who have the
same ‘‘health plan’’ have an identical contract with the same insurer
concerning benefits coverage, cost-sharing, quality, services, etc.
Since objectives and strategies of insurers can differ across health
plans, this paper will speak of health plans instead of insurers as
decision makers.
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health plans to risk rate their premiums and thereby
improves affordability of health plans for the sick. In the
presence of premium regulation — as is common in regu-
lated health plan markets— REmitigates incentives for risk
selection and thereby improves incentives for health plans
to accept and serve the sick as well as the healthy [20].2
Recent research has shown that even state-of-the-art RE
models — such as those used under the Affordable Care
Act in the United States or those used under the Health
Insurance Act in the Netherlands — systematically
undercompensate groups of consumers in relatively poor
health and overcompensate the complementary groups of
consumers in relatively good health [16, 30], exposing
health plans and consumers to incentives for risk selection.
As described by van de Ven and Ellis [28], risk selection
threatens the performance of (regulated) health plan mar-
kets since it may reduce (1) the quality of care (because
plans may have a disincentive to meet the preferences of
the sick), (2) the efficiency of care (because risk selection
may be a more cost-effective strategy for plans to reduce
medical spending than improving the efficiency of care),
(3) the efficient sorting of consumers among plans (when
market segmentation by risk elevates premiums for par-
ticular plans), and (4) the affordability of health plans to
the sick (when the same market segmentation causes the
sick to face higher premiums). To contend with these
potential problems, researchers and policy makers work to
improve the properties of health plan payment schemes.3 In
general, three strategies can be applied to reduce incentives
for risk selection in regulated health plan markets:
improving RE, increasing risk sharing (e.g., via mandatory
reinsurance or risk corridors) and relaxing premium-rate
restrictions [28]. This paper focuses on the first strategy.
The conventional approach to reducing under- or over-
compensation for specific groups is enriching the RE
model with new/better risk adjustor variables that indicate
membership in these groups. If a group of interest (e.g.,
persons with congestive heart failure) is explicitly recog-
nized by a risk adjustor variable (e.g., via a diagnostic cost
group for ‘‘congestive heart failure’’), ordinary least
squares (OLS, the common estimation method for RE
models) ensures that the payment for this group will equal
the average medical spending of this group.4 For some
groups, however, appropriate risk adjustor variables may
not (yet) be available. In this paper we study two concrete
examples in the setting of the Dutch national health
insurance: ‘‘users of home care in the previous year’’ and
‘‘users of physiotherapy in the previous year’’. These
groups are known to be substantially undercompensated by
the Dutch RE model. So far, however, the Dutch govern-
ment has not found appropriate risk adjustor variables to
indicate membership in these particular groups. One option
considered by the Dutch government is using the indicators
‘‘yes/no use of home care in the previous year’’ and ‘‘yes/
no use of physiotherapy in the previous year’’ as risk
adjustor variables. The Dutch Minister of Health, however,
has acknowledged that these indicators are inappropriate
for inclusion in the RE model since they would introduce
substantial incentives to overuse these services [37].5
Though, as long as the undercompensation of the groups in
question continues to persist, health plans are confronted
with incentives for risk selection, e.g., by skimping on the
quality of home care and physiotherapy.
VanKleef et al. [34] have proposed reducing the under- or
overcompensation for a group in case appropriate risk
adjustor variables to identify this group are not available by
introducing under/overpayments for existing risk adjustor
variables that are correlated with membership in this group.
For example, if ‘‘yes/no use of home care in the previous
year’’ is positively correlated with the risk adjustor variable
‘‘yes/no inclusion in any diagnostic cost group (DCG)’’, the
undercompensation for the home care group can be reduced
by increasing the risk equalization payment for people with a
DCG. Note that—given the zero sum principle onwhich RE
systems in practice are based— the increase in payments for
people with a DCG comes with a decrease of payments for
people without a DCG and thus a reduction of the over-
compensation for non-users of home care in the previous
year. Though this strategy is intuitively appealing, van Kleef
et al. did not provide an analytical solution for calculating
the changes in weights for existing risk adjustor variables. In
this paper we propose and illustrate an analytical approach to
solve this problem that can be easily implemented in prac-
tice: constrained least-squares regression.
In practice, RE models are estimated by OLS regression
using a series of indicators as risk adjustor variables. As
described by van de Ven and Ellis [28], not all indicators
are appropriate for serving as a risk adjustor variable.
Examples of inappropriate indicators may include infor-
mation directly based on costs and utilization which would
introduce incentives for overuse and gaming (i.e.,
2 Newhouse [20] defines risk selection as actions by consumers and
health plans to exploit unpriced risk heterogeneity and break pooling
arrangements. Often the term selection is also used to refer to the
outcome of these actions.
3 By ‘‘health plan payment scheme’’ we mean the total set of
payment features, which can include risk equalization, reinsurance,
risk corridors and premiums among other features.
4 The expected value of an OLS residual conditional on a dummy
variable regressor is zero. The statistical residual from an OLS model
Footnote 4 continued
is the individual-level over- or underpayment in a RE model based on
the regression coefficients.
5 In the presence of such risk adjusters, providing more home care
and physiotherapy in the current year will lead to higher RE payments
in the next year.
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discretionary coding by plans or providers seeking to
enhance revenues). Recent research, for instance, finds
substantial ‘‘upcoding’’ in health plans paid by capitation in
the US Medicare program [11]. Another example is health
survey information, which may identify a group of interest
and be a highly informative predictor of medical spending,
but too expensive to collect on a regular basis for everyone
in a risk pool. Conventional RE ignores such inappropriate
indicators during model estimation. Constrained regression
allows for indirect use of such indicators by constraining
the estimated coefficients of the RE model to reduce under-
or overcompensation of the groups identified by these
indicators. This constrained regression can improve com-
pensation for these groups by exploiting the empirical
correlation between omitted and included indicators. At the
same time, however, constraints will introduce under- or
overcompensation for included groups (compared to OLS).
In Section ‘‘Theory and concepts’’ of this paper we will
argue that in order to quantify this trade-off two questions
need to be answered: ‘‘Which groups are relevant in terms
of risk selection actions?’’ and ‘‘What is the relative
importance of under- and overcompensation for these
groups?’’ By making assumptions on these aspects, we will
show empirically that the gains from a well-chosen con-
straint in terms of improved payment fit for omitted indi-
cators can be worth the costs in terms of reduced payment
fit for included indicators.
Our empirical application is the national basic health
insurance for curative care in the Netherlands, a well-
established example of a regulated individual health plan
market based on principles of regulated competition [27].
In spite of a sophisticated RE model, policy researchers
have identified groups that are systematically under- or
overcompensated [30]. The two groups we study in this
paper are known to be undercompensated by about 1200
euro (users of home care in the previous year) and 900 euro
(users of physiotherapy in the previous year) per person per
year. So far, the Dutch government has not yet found
appropriate risk adjustor variables to improve compensa-
tion for these groups.
The paper is structured as follows. Section ‘‘Theory and
concepts’’ discusses the method of constrained regression
and develops measures for quantifying the trade-off
between improved payment fit for omitted indicators and
reduced payment fit for included indicators when using
constrained regressions in the context of RE. In Sec-
tions ‘‘Data and empirical methods’’ and ‘‘Results’’ we
apply our approach to the Dutch RE model of 2015 using
data on medical spending and characteristics of nearly all
individuals with basic health insurance in the Netherlands
(N = 16.5 million). We explore using constrained regres-
sions to address the undercompensation of the users of
home care or physiotherapy in the previous year. We apply
our measures from Section ‘‘Theory and concepts’’ to show
that, generally, some reduction in undercompensation for
indicators omitted from the RE model can be worth the
increase in under- or overcompensation for indicators
included in the model. Section ‘‘Discussion’’ discusses our
main findings and their implications.
Theory and concepts
Constrained regression
Least squares regression methods choose values for a set of
parameters, the estimated coefficients, to minimize the
residual sum of squared differences between the actual and
fitted values from the regression. A researcher may place
constraints on the choice of the coefficients in this mini-
mization for various reasons. One common reason for
imposing a constraint is to test a hypothesis about a set of
coefficients. For example, to test the hypothesis that earned
and unearned income has the same effect on household
consumption, a constraint can impose the restriction that
the coefficients on these two types of income are the same.
The researcher can compare the model fit with and without
the constraint using an F-statistic to test whether the
reduction in explained variance is statistically significant; if
it is, the hypothesis of constant returns is rejected.
Our motivation for introducing a constraint is different,
and is akin to methods of constrained optimization. Health
plan payment schemes have multiple objectives subject to
trade-offs. For example, in the design of a public health
insurance program, one objective may be to reduce finan-
cial risk of the population while another objective may be
to reduce public expenditures, with a trade-off between the
two. The locus of efficient policies can be found by max-
imizing one objective subject to a given level of attainment
of the other, by, for example, maximizing financial pro-
tection for the population for a given level of public
expenditures.6 By conducting this maximization for dif-
ferent levels of public expenditure, the researcher can
characterize the trade-off between spending more public
money and reducing financial risk of the population.
Introducing constraints into a RE model serves a similar
purpose. Constrained least squares regression addresses
selection incentives regarding included and omitted indi-
cators simultaneously by pursuing the ‘‘usual’’ objective of
a RE model — minimizing squared deviations at the
individual level for the included indicators — subject to a
6 A closely related and well-known application of this approach can
be found in the Appendix ‘‘On Optimal Insurance Policies’’ of
Kenneth Arrow’s Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical
care [1].
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maximum value of under- or overcompensation for the
omitted indicators. By varying the maximum value of this
second objective, researchers can trace out the trade-offs
between fit on the included indicators and over- or under-
compensation on the omitted ones.7
Constrained regressions have been studied previously in
the context of RE. Glazer et al. [13] proposed using con-
strained regression to address selection problems, where
the constraints were derived from first-order conditions for
plan profit maximization, with one constraint for each
service provided by the plan. RE weights were best fitting
given a set of linear constraints that guaranteed a balanced
set of incentives for plans to fund all services. This theo-
retical approach has never been implemented empirically,
probably due to the complexity of specifying the con-
straints. In addition, there was no obvious way to ‘‘tighten’’
or ‘‘loosen’’ the constraints as there is here with the mag-
nitude of undercompensation being the target of the con-
straint. McGuire et al. [18] and Eijkenaar et al. [8] have
used constrained regressions in the context of RE, though
for purposes other than addressing selection incentives.
This paper focuses on situations where compensation for
omitted variables is desired. This starting point is distinct
from that of Schokkaert and van de Voorde [25] who study
situations where compensation for omitted variables is not
desired. They argue that when omitted indicators for which
compensation is not desired (which they refer to as R-
variables)8 are correlated with indicators included in the
RE model for which compensation is desired (C-variables),
conventional RE leads to biased estimates of coefficients
for C-variables since these will (partly) pick up the varia-
tion in spending due to the omitted R-variables. In
Schokkaert and van de Voorde’s terminology our paper
exclusively focuses on C-variables.
Evaluating incentives for selection in RE models
A major purpose of RE models is to mitigate incentives for
plans to over- or underserve groups among the population.
Incentives to underserve enrollees with a mental illness, for
example, are created if the payments a plan receives for
members of this group fall below the costs they bring to the
plan. A RE model that recognizes and pays more for per-
sons with some mental illness diagnoses can reduce the gap
between average costs and average payments. However, if
the RE model recognizes some but not all mental condi-
tions, a plan might seek to deter persons with mental illness
from joining by not contracting with first-best providers of
mental health services—an example of inefficiency created
by selection incentives. Incentives for a plan to ‘‘distort’’
its benefits away from the efficient mix to attract/deter have
been studied theoretically since Rothschild and Stiglitz
[24],9 and empirically since the beginning of the use of RE
in public insurance programs [21]. In the US context,
empirical evidence confirms that plans respond to this type
of incentive in service provision.10 In the Netherlands,
several health plans have reported publicly that the
imperfect RE discourages them from improving the quality
of care for groups that are systematically undercompen-
sated [29].
Papers and reports concerned with incentives for selec-
tion first define the group or groups of concern and then
compare average payment for members of the group to
average medical spending by simulation methods. Evalu-
ations of payment systems in Medicare and in the mar-
ketplaces in the US commonly employ ‘‘predictive ratios’’,
a ratio with simulated RE payments for the group in the
numerator and medical spending in the denominator.
‘‘Underpayment’’ is indicated if the predictive ratio is less
than 1.0. Evaluating the RE model proposed for the mar-
ketplaces, Kautter et al. [14] created subgroups of indi-
viduals by predicted spending and computed predictive
ratios for these subgroups.11 In an evaluation of the CMS-
HCC model used in Medicare, Pope et al. [22] report
predictive ratios for subgroups defined by disease, numbers
of prior hospitalizations, demographic characteristics, and
other factors.12
Other papers calculate the difference between RE pay-
ments and spending to assess selection incentives, with the
difference being referred to as ‘‘undercompensation’’ if
payments are less than spending and ‘‘overcompensation’’
7 The form of constraints we use is written out in the ‘‘Data and
empirical methods’’ Section of this paper. See, in particular, Eq. (2).
8 An example of an R-variable might be an indicator for smoking.
Smoking may predict higher medical spending but it may be
undesirable to ‘‘reward’’ the health plan of a smoker by higher RE
payments.
9 The Rothschild-Stiglitz model was adapted to managed health care
insurance by Glazer and McGuire [12]. See Breyer et al. [3] for a
recent review.
10 Cao and McGuire [4] in Medicare and Eggleston and Bir [6] in
employer-based insurance find patterns of spending on various
services consistent with service-level selection among competing at-
risk plans. Ellis et al. [7] rank services according to incentives to
undersupply them. Consistent with service-level selection, they show
that HMO-type plans tend to underspend on services (in relation to
the average) just as the selection index predicts. This pattern of
spending is not observed among enrollees in unmanaged plans. See
also Carey [5].
11 Defining subgroups of the population on the basis of predicted
spending can lead to predictive ratios close to 1.0 even if the
prediction model itself is weak, and therefore is not necessarily a
mark in favor of the RE model. Unless the model itself does a good
job at differentiating high- from low-cost individuals, a predictive
ratio according to a ranking by predicted spending is not very
informative.
12 Other measures of individual and group fit have been proposed and
applied in the literature (see [36] for a review).
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in the opposite case. Van Kleef et al. [30] merged survey
information with health claims for a subset of people in the
Netherlands to calculate undercompensation for various
groups of people, including those with low physical and
mental self-rated health statuses and those reporting
chronic conditions. In the current paper we track over- and
undercompensation, both for defining constraints and as a
basis for our evaluation metrics.
In empirical research, both forms of measures, predic-
tive ratios and monetary differences, are primarily applied
to groups for whom an indicator is not included in the RE
model. The reason is that under the ordinary least squares
approach, RE models eliminate under- and overcompen-
sation for groups with indicators included in the RE model
(see footnote 4). Under a constrained least squares
approach, however, over- and undercompensation can
appear for the latter as well.
Missing from the literature is an accepted method for
aggregating group-level measures of under- and overcom-
pensation to the entire population, or, in other words, there
is no accepted summary measure for comparing the com-
prehensive performance of alternative RE models affecting
multiple groups simultaneously. While we can agree that
reducing undercompensation for a group of interest is an
improvement for that particular group, what if a RE
alternative decreases undercompensation for one group but
increases it for another? Which RE model is preferred?
These questions are directly relevant for this paper since
the type of constraints applied here are expected to improve
compensation for omitted groups but will generally worsen
it for included groups. A weighted sum of under- and
overcompensations for all groups of concern (both omitted
and included groups) is a natural basis for construction of a
summary measure with the weight being the share of the
population in the group of interest. In the next section, we
propose a family of such measures that we apply later to
empirically quantify the trade-off between improved pay-
ment fit for some groups and reduced payment fit for
others.
A summary measure of selection incentives
As noted previously, to quantify the trade-off emerging
with constrained regressions we need to identify the groups
of interest and develop a method for comparing the under-
and overcompensation for these groups.
Which groups are relevant in terms of risk selection
actions?
Newhouse (1993) defines risk selection as ‘‘actions by
consumers and health plans to exploit unpriced risk
heterogeneity and break pooling arrangements. Often the
term selection is also used to refer to the outcome of these
actions’’. In other words: risk selection is about actions (by
health plans and consumers) with the intention and/or the
outcome that undercompensated groups are (to some
extent) separated from overcompensated groups. This
implies that evaluation of a RE model starts with stipu-
lating the groups that can be targets of risk selection
actions. How would this work? For example, if plans can
only take actions that discriminate between people under
the age of 65 and those above the age of 65, these become
the groups of concern when it comes to (measuring) risk
selection (incentives). A RE formula fully addresses
selection incentives in this circumstance if it eliminates
incentives to favor one group over the other. Analogously,
if plans can only discriminate on the basis of ‘‘yes/no
chronic condition’’ then these are the two relevant groups.
If health plans can discriminate on combinations of ‘‘yes/
no[ 65’’ and ‘‘yes/no chronic condition’’, there will be
four groups of concern, and so on.
Some research defines groups according to a single
geographic indicator under the thinking that a health plan
might favor or disfavor certain regions because of sys-
tematic differences in medical spending, as was done in a
study of Germany by Bauhoff [2]. Other research defines
groups according to the services used, the idea being that a
health plan could favor or disfavor primary versus some
kinds of specialty care, for example, to encourage/dis-
courage potential enrollees anticipating making use of
those services.13 Since the instruments for health plans to
engage in risk selection differ across health care schemes,
there is no universal set of relevant groups. Thus, the first
step for evaluating incentives for risk selection in a par-
ticular setting is to identify the possible selection actions in
that setting and to derive the relevant groups. For example,
in the Netherlands health plans are unable to discriminate
at the individual level due to open enrollment require-
ments. On the other hand, however, plans can discriminate
across groups on the basis of network design. For example,
contracting with first-best physicians for treatment of dis-
ease X will attract patients with disease X; conversely, a
poor network in terms of quality or convenience will deter
patients in that disease group.
What is the relative importance of under-
and overcompensations for these groups?
Once the relevant groups in terms of selection actions have
been identified, the second step for evaluating RE models
is to compare the importance of the under- and overcom-
pensations for these groups. Literature on selection
13 See Ellis and McGuire [9] for implementation of this approach in
Medicare and McGuire et al. [19] for its application in marketplaces.
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incentives provides at least four arguments as to why the
relative importance of under- or overcompensations may
differ across groups and vary with the size of these under-
and overcompensations. A first argument comes from van
Barneveld et al. [26] who contend that small pre-
dictable profits and losses are likely to be irrelevant for a
health plan. Selection can be costly and the net benefits are
uncertain, and small incentives may simply not induce a
health plan to act. A second argument derived from stan-
dard welfare economics is made by Layton et al. [16] who
show that the welfare loss from price distortions due to
under- or overcompensation by a RE model is proportional
to the square of the payment gap, implying that the inef-
ficiency from selection goes up more than proportionally
with the magnitude of the under- and overcompensation. A
third argument can be drawn from the work by Ellis and
McGuire [9] who argue that selection incentives do not just
depend on an indicator’s predictiveness (how well the
indicator co-varies with total health care spending) but also
on predictability of that indicator (how well the indicator
can be anticipated) and demand responsiveness of indi-
viduals scoring on that indicator. For example, Ellis and
McGuire find that both ‘‘use of durable medical equip-
ment’’ and ‘‘use of anesthesia’’ are indicators with high
predictiveness but that the first indicator is much more
predictable (and therefore much more vulnerable to service
level distortion) than the latter. This point implies that
potential selection inefficiency of under- or overcompen-
sation for one group can be larger than that of an equal
under- or overcompensation for other groups. A fourth
argument comes from van de Ven et al. [29] who contend
that the degree of inefficiency depends on the specific
selection actions that can occur as a consequence of under-
or overcompensation. They distinguish many selection
actions, such as selective advertising, offering a choice of
deductibles, making supplementary insurance (un)attrac-
tive for certain groups, offering group contracts, and
quality skimping. They argue that of all possible selection
actions ‘‘quality skimping’’ is a special threat to the func-
tioning of regulated health plan markets because it not only
reduces market efficiency, but also the quality of medical
care. Incentives for quality skimping, however, are only
present when groups with relatively strong preferences for
high quality are undercompensated.14 After all, if these
groups would be overcompensated, health plans would
have incentives to improve quality of care. Thus, for groups
with strong preferences for high quality — presumably
those with a chronic condition — undercompensation may
be worse than overcompensation.15
A summary measure of under- and overcompensation
for relevant groups
To formalize our ideas about a summary measure for
quantifying the trade-off between better-targeted compen-
sation for some groups and worse-targeted compensation
for others, consider a set of selection actions that allows
health plans to discriminate among G mutually exclusive
groups indexed by g with g = 1,…, G.16 We can then use
data to determine:
sg the share of the population in group g, with
P
gsg = 1,
rg the average plan revenue for a person in group g,
cg the average plan cost for a person in group g, and
rg  cg, the average under/overcompensation for a
person in group g.
Given these parameters, under- and overcompensations
can be summarized by
P
g sg rg  cg



, i.e., the sum of
absolute under- and overcompensations weighted by the
share of the affected population. We follow standard
assumptions (used in calculation of both predictive ratios
and over/undercompensation) by regarding medical
spending as plan cost and figuring over- and undercom-
pensation for an average plan.17 With this, in the Dutch
context, over- and undercompensation is solely a function
of the RE payments.18 Specifically, average plan revenues
equals average predicted spending from the RE model and
rg  cg



 boils down to absolute residual spending for
group g from the RE model. Moreover,
P
g sg rg  cg
 
equals zero.
As a next step, we incorporate the relative importance of
under- and overcompensation by weighting these for each
group. As discussed above, the literature provides argu-
ments for different types of weighting. Since our empirical
application is intended as ‘‘a proof of concept,’’ we will
simply apply one type of weighting, which is raising under-
and overcompensation to a power p. This weighting func-
tion is common in the statistical and economic literature on
14 In a zero-sum RE payment scheme, undercompensation of the
chronically ill implies overcompensation of the complementary group
of healthy individuals, and vice versa.
15 Note that constrained regression can be a tool for changing
undercompensation for groups of chronically ill into overcompensa-
tion. A related argument is made by Lorenz [17] who also identifies
empirical methods that weight over- and undercompensation
asymmetrically.
16 The discussion in this section draws on Layton et al. [16] who
derive a similar summary measure starting with conditions for profit
maximization by a health plan.
17 This avoids concerns with selection across plans, differential
premiums, and differential plan efficiency.
18 In practice multiple payment features may coexist (e.g., risk
equalization and reinsurance). Practical use of our summary measure
should incorporate all these relevant features. For example, reinsur-
ance figures into plan payments in marketplaces in the US. Simulating
payments recognizing these plan payment features can be used in
calculating predictive ratios or over/undercompensation [16, 32].
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plan payment: individual and group R-squared measures
are obviously based on squared deviations19 and in welfare
economics, the efficiency loss associated with a price dis-
tortion (such as a tax) is proportional to the square of the
distortion. In our empirical analyses, we apply several
variants of this weighting function with powers ranging
from 1 to 2.20 We thus propose a summary measure of the
form:
L¼
X
g
sg rg  cg



p with 1 p 2: ð1Þ
The summary measure L is intuitive, weighting under/
overcompensation raised to a power by the share of the
affected population, and is easy to compute. L has a
minimum value of 0 and no upper bound. Comparing L
for RE models is meaningful only for comparing models
estimated on the same data with the same definitions of
group membership. In our empirical analyses we estimate
all RE models on exactly the same data with exactly the
same group definition. Under this procedure, RE
scheme 1 will be said to be preferred to scheme 2 if
L1\L2.
As we noted at the outset of this section the relevant
form of Eq. (1) depends on stipulation of the relevant
groups and definition of the relative importance of under-
and overcompensation, which are not straightforward
decisions. Taking these factors into account would ideally
be based on an elicitation of the concerns of regulators and
an analysis of what actions plans can take and the welfare
consequences of these actions. We intend the current paper
to be a ‘‘proof of concept’’ of the idea of using constraints
in a RE model. We select a subset of the groups that are
relevant in terms of selection and assume a simple
weighting function of under- and overcompensation.
As we explain in the ‘‘Data and empirical methods’’
Section, our groups are categorized by a set of indicators
included in the current Dutch RE model and a set of
indicators omitted from the model. The utility of con-
straints on regression coefficients emerges when at least
one indicator is omitted from the RE model. We will use
the included and the omitted indicators jointly to define
mutually exclusive groups for the entire Dutch population,
and compute L for this partition of the population. We also
will compute L for the two sets of included and omitted
indicators separately. These two partial classifications
allow us to show the effect of constraints on groups iden-
tified by the included versus the omitted indicators.
Tightening the constraint improves things for the omitted
indicators but imposes a cost on fit among the included
indicators.
Data and empirical methods
Data
The empirical analyses are based on administrative data
including individual-level information on medical spend-
ing and risk indicators for almost the entire Dutch popu-
lation in 2012 (N = 16.5 million). These data come from
various sources, including health plans, tax authorities and
the registration service for social benefits.21 The resulting
merged data are those used to estimate the RE model for
health plan payment in the Netherlands in 2015. As a first
step in our analyses we faithfully replicate this model, such
that our ‘‘base model’’ accurately indicates expected over-
and undercompensation in the Netherlands for 2015 [8].
Our alternative RE models and simulations modify this
base model and are estimated on the same data. Here we
briefly describe the risk indicators included in the base
model and provide some general statistics.
The Dutch RE model for 2015 is the product of more
than 20 years of research and experience and includes the
following indicators: 40 risk classes based on an interaction
between age and gender, 25 risk classes based on the use of
specified prescription drugs in the previous year referred to
as pharmacy-based cost groups or PCGs [15], 16 risk
classes based on diagnostic information from hospital
treatment in the previous year referred to as diagnoses-
based cost groups or DCGs [23, 33], seven risk classes for
people with high costs in multiple prior years referred to as
multiple-year high cost groups or MHCGs [32], five risk
classes based on the use of durable medical equipment in
the previous year referred to as durable medical equipment
cost groups or DMECGs [31], four risk classes based on an
interaction between two age groups and yes/no
‘‘PCG ? DCG ? MHCG ? DMECG[ 0’’, 12 risk clas-
ses based on an interaction between socioeconomic status
and age, 10 risk classes based on regional characteristics
and 19 risk classes based on an interaction between source
19 See Van Veen et al. [36] for discussion of the various statistical
measures applied to evaluation of RE schemes.
20 Layton et al. [16] propose a metric similar to (1) with p = 2,
squaring the payment-cost gap for each group, also appealing to the
usual form of welfare loss in economics, in which the area of a
welfare triangle is proportional to the square of a discrepancy between
the first-best and the actual price. Their selection metric measures
improvement in incentives over a payment system with no premium
categories and no RE, and falls between 0 and 1. Lorenz [16]
considers situations in which over- and undercompensation may
impose different magnitudes of losses, and estimators that would be
appropriate for minimizing the asymmetric loss functions.
21 In estimating the RE model for 2015, medical spending from 2012
has been adjusted to reflect mandatory coverage changes in the period
2013–2015. In a second stage coefficients were linearly adjusted for
expected cost inflation. For reasons of simplicity we excluded the
second stage from our analysis.
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of income and age. All risk indicators have been carefully
developed in research programs sponsored by the Dutch
Ministry of Health. For further details on these risk indi-
cators, see van Kleef et al. [30].22
The RE model of 2015 was estimated by a least-squares
regression with medical spending in 2012 as the dependent
variable and the risk classes described above as 138 inde-
pendent dummy variables.23 Medical spending includes the
expenses on primary care, pharmaceuticals, hospital inpa-
tient and outpatient care, maternity care, obstetrics and
medical devices among other categories, but excludes
expenses on mental health care and home health nursing
care.24 Although the latter two categories of spending are
included in the mandatory benefit package of 2015, they
are omitted from the main RE model, with funds allocated
for them using a separate RE model. In this paper we will
be concerned with the primary RE model used to allocate
more than 80% of health care costs among health plans in
the Netherlands in 2015 [8]. We refer to the RE model of
2015 as the ‘‘base model’’.
Table 1 provides some information on the prevalence of
risk characteristics and the distribution of medical spending
in our data. For simplicity of presentation we report
aggregated risk categories instead of all 138 explanatory
variables separately. Average spending in the population
equals 1848 euros per person per year. Not surprisingly,
average spending is relatively high for people age 65 years
or older, those who receive a disability benefit, people
living at an address with more than 15 residents (which
approximates being in an institution for long-term care,
which is paid for via a separate insurance scheme) and
those in a PCG, DCG, DMECG and/or MHCG. The latter
four are the most direct indicators of morbidity; nearly 23%
of the population is classified by at least one of these
indicators.
In addition to the administrative data, we use health
survey information to assess how constraints on under-
compensation for one omitted group affect estimates of
over- and undercompensation for a series of other omitted
groups of interest. The survey was conducted in 2011
among a representative sample of the Dutch population
and includes a broad range of questions on general health
status, physical impairments, mental health problems,
particular chronic diseases and prior utilization of medical
care. A unique, anonymous person identifier allows
merging the survey information with the administrative
data. We calculate under- and overcompensation for sur-
vey groups as the predicted expenses from a RE model
estimated on the administrative data (N = 16.5 million)
minus the actual expenses. In contrast to the administra-
tive data, the survey data are available only for a small
sample (N = 14,310) of the population, implying that
under- or overcompensation for groups identified from the
survey may be vulnerable to random variation. We report
on groups for which under- or overcompensation by the
base model is statistically significant. For the specific
definition of these groups see van Veen et al. [35],
Appendix 2).
Selecting study indicators included and study
indicators omitted from the RE model
For our empirical application we assume that health plans
are able to discriminate on the basis of the following
information: ‘‘yes/no use of home care in the previous
year’’, ‘‘yes/no use of physiotherapy in the previous year’’,
and DCGs. The first two indicators are omitted from the
Dutch RE model while the DCGs are included. This set of
indicators allows study of how constrained regression
methods affect fit for groups defined by both omitted and
included indicators.
The Dutch DCGs are a hierarchical categorization of
persons based on selected diagnostic information from
inpatient or outpatient hospital treatment in the previous
year.25 Persons are classified in a DCG if they received at
least one of these selected treatments in the previous year.
22 A complete description of the Dutch payment system would
include some subsidiary (and less well-developed) RE models for
some small cost categories, and description of some of the regional
adjustments built into the main model. These details are not important
for our simulations. Readers are referred to Eijkenaar et al. [8] for full
details on the RE models.
23 Analogous to the RE methodology in the Netherlands, medical
spending in 2012 (dependent variable) is annualized by dividing
actual individual-level costs of 2012 by the fraction of the year an
individual was enrolled in the basic health insurance in 2012.
Subsequently, this ‘‘fraction’’ is included as a weight in the estimation
model and computation of means. For example, an individual who
was enrolled for 6 months and had 1000 euros expenses is given
annualized costs of 2000 euros (1000/0.5) and a weight of 0.5.
24 Since medical expenses for home care itself are excluded, the
undercompensation of about 1200 euros on users of home care
implies that prior use of home care has predictive value for other
types of medical expenses. A possible explanation is that users of
home care have a relatively high probability of dying.
25 The DCG classification was developed in several steps. First, a
team of medical experts carefully determined whether or not
diagnoses refer to a chronic condition. Diagnoses referring to a
chronic condition were categorized in 144 more or less clinically
homogeneous groups, which — in a next step — were clustered into
15 DCGs based on residual cost (according to a prediction model
including explanatory variables based on age, gender and PCGs)
using Ward’s hierarchical clustering method. If enrollees have
multiple diagnoses that would fall into different DCGs, they are
classified in only one DCG, i.e., the one with the highest estimated
coefficient. For further details about the Dutch DCGs see Van Kleef
et al. [33].
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The diagnostic cost group (DCG) categorization partitions
the population into 16 mutually exclusive groups. As
shown in Table 2, the ‘‘No DCG’’ group, those with none
of the selected treatments in the previous period, account
for 91% of the population. Where the ‘‘No DCG’’ group
has below average medical expenses, the higher DCGs
have above average expenses. Since all DCGs are explic-
itly included as dummy regressors in the Dutch RE model,
average predicted spending for these groups perfectly fits
average actual spending (see footnote 4), implying that for
all DCGs the average under/overcompensation is zero (see
Table 2).
Each of our omitted indicators ‘‘yes/no use of home care
in the year t-1’’ and ‘‘yes/no use of physiotherapy in the
year t-1’’ partitions the population into two mutually
exclusive groups.26 Given the zero-sum principle of the
Dutch RE model (and the constrained models estimated in
our empirical analyses), reductions in undercompensation
for the ‘‘yes’’ groups imply corresponding reductions in
overcompensation for the complementary ‘‘no’’ groups.
For example, if the undercompensation for users of home
care reduces by 40%, the overcompensation for the com-
plementary group of non-users will reduce by 40% too. For
simplicity of presentation we primarily focus on the two
‘‘yes’’ groups. As shown in Table 2, these two groups
Table 1 Population frequency
and medical spending (in euros,
2012) at aggregated levels of
risk characteristics (N = 16.5
million)
Population frequency (%) Medical spending
Mean SD
Men,\65 42 1207 5893
Men, C65 8 4612 11,050
Women,\65 41 1487 5212
Women, C65 9 4123 8889
Region, clusters 1–5 50 1979 6941
Region, clusters 6–10 50 1719 6237
Source of income, reference group (age\18 or[64) 38 2477 8235
Source of income, disability benefits 5 3817 10,570
Source of income, social security benefits 2 2321 7110
Source of income, student 3 588 2717
Source of income, self-employment 4 1012 3814
Source of income, other (including employment) 48 1282 4541
Socioeconomic status, home address[15 residents 1 4507 10,219
Socioeconomic status, income deciles 1–3 30 1842 6526
Socioeconomic status, income deciles 4–7 40 1869 6527
Socioeconomic status, income deciles 8–10 30 1721 6555
Pharmacy-based cost group (PCG)
No 82 1212 5199
Yes 18 4751 10,417
Diagnoses-based cost group (DCG)
No 91 1353 4921
Yes 9 6855 14,530
Durable medical equipment cost group (DMECG)
No 99 1772 6382
Yes 1 10,933 17,099
Multiple-year high cost group (MHCG)
No 94 1378 4957
Yes 6 9536 17,056
PCG, DCG, DMECG and/or MHCG
No 77 984 4106
Yes 23 4784 11,090
Total population 100 1848 6597
26 These indicators are based on the use of home care and
physiotherapy as far as covered by the Dutch basic benefit package
of 2015. This benefit package fully covers the use of home care.
Physiotherapy is only covered for treatment of certain chronic
conditions and above a threshold of 20 visits.
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comprise 2.7% and 2.4% of the population in year t,
respectively. Both groups are systematically undercom-
pensated by the current Dutch RE model. So far, however,
the Dutch government has not found appropriate risk
adjustor variables to indicate membership in these partic-
ular groups [37]. For some analyses we convert the two
yes/no indicators into four mutually exclusive categories
by crossing the indicators and classifying the population as
having none, home care only, physiotherapy only, or both
indicators in the previous year.
Constraining coefficients in the RE models
We introduce a series of constraints to the base RE model
that limit the under/overcompensation for one or more
omitted indicators with a fixed percentage. This works as
follows.
For any person i, the RE payment is Yi =
P
jbjxij where
xij is the value of the included 0/1 indicator j for person i,
and bj is the weight on the indicator in the RE formula. If
the number of people in the group of interest g is ng the
average payment for a member of group g is:
Yg ¼ 1
ng
X
i2g
X
j
bjxij: ð2Þ
This can be rewritten as:
Yg ¼
X
j
bjxgj; ð3Þ
where xgj is the mean value of indicator variable j for group
g. This group mean must be calculated on an initial pass
through the data. The constraints then take the form of
setting Yg equal to a target value which can be easily
implemented with the RESTRICT statement in the PROC
REG procedure in SAS. This constraint is simply an
equation linear in the coefficients of the RE model,
resulting in coefficient estimates that maximize the fit of
the model as measured by an R-squared given that the
compensation for g equals the specified value. The target
value for Yg can be chosen as any amount; here, we reduce
Table 2 Population frequency, medical spending and under/overcompensation by the Dutch RE model of 2015 (base model) in euros (2012) for
the 4 omitted and 16 included indicators studied in our empirical analyses (N = 16.5 million)
Population frequency (%) Medical spending Under/overcompensation
base model
Mean SD
Omitted indicators
Use of home care in t-1
No 97.31 1659 5985 34
Yes 2.69 8696 16,541 -1231
Use of physiotherapy in t-1
No 97.62 1737 6313 23
Yes 2.38 6422 13,124 -922
Included indicators
No DCG 91.00 1353 4921 0
DCG1 0.67 5573 8943 0
DCG2 1.49 4649 8100 0
DCG3 1.11 4196 8243 0
DCG4 1.80 5058 9541 0
DCG5 1.16 6291 11,420 0
DCG6 1.26 7645 13,461 0
DCG7 0.55 8832 15,511 0
DCG8 0.12 10,039 15,978 0
DCG9 0.30 9582 18,583 0
DCG10 0.33 13,175 20,678 0
DCG11 0.04 14,557 25,078 0
DCG12 0.07 17,107 28,243 0
DCG13 0.04 25,105 41,154 0
DCG14 0.04 90,296 42,858 0
DCG15 0.01 62,451 110,800 0
Total population 100 1848 6597 0
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undercompensation for the omitted group(s) to a fixed
portion a of the undercompensation by the base model.
This can be written as:
Yg ¼ cg  aðcg 
X
j
bj;OLSxgjÞ; ð4Þ
where cg equals the average plan costs for a person in
group g and
P
j bj;OLSxgj equals the average plan revenue
under the base model (OLS) for a person in group g.
An interesting feature of constraints in this form is that
they do not require that information on yes/no membership
of g is available for the entire risk pool. Instead, it is sufficient
to have a good approximation of the average per person
medical spending for g, as well as the mean indicators values
conditional on g [see Eq. ((3)]. Information on these
parameters obtained from a decent sample of the risk pool
(e.g., respondents of a health survey) could be sufficient.
Empirical analyses
As shown in Table 2, the Dutch RE model of 2015 (our
‘‘base model’’) leads to an average per person undercom-
pensation of 1231 euros for users of home care in the
previous year and 922 euros for users of physiotherapy in
the previous year. Given these magnitudes, we begin by
estimating a series of constrained regressions, where in
each case there is just one constraint. For each of the two
omitted indicators we reduce the undercompensation in
series by 20, 40, 60, 80 and 100%. For each model we
calculate measures of overall fit (R-squared and Cummings
prediction measure (CPM)) as well as measures for group
fit (under- or overcompensation for included and omitted
groups).27 To quantify the trade-off between improved fit
for omitted groups and deteriorated fit for included groups
we track a series of our summary measure (1) based on the
mutually exclusive set of four groups identified by the
omitted indicators, the mutually exclusive set of the 16
included DCGs, and for the cross-product of the two sets
(64 groups). We also consider a range of powers to apply to
the payment gap for each group of interest in order to check
the sensitivity of results to the form of the weighting
function. In a next step, guided by the results for the single
constraints, we try several combinations of constraints for
the two omitted indicators to check whether two constraints
can produce better overall model performance than any
single constraint. We find a superior two-constraint speci-
fication that performs better than any model with a single
constraint.
Results
Table 3 shows results for the base RE model and for the
same model supplemented with a series of single con-
straints to reduce undercompensation for the group with
use of home care in year t-1. Since the constraint will
bind, the constrained models will always yield a lower R-
squared than the unconstrained base RE model. The
incremental loss in R-squared goes up as the constraint is
more binding, but the absolute magnitude of the reduction
in R-squared is always very small: the most binding con-
straint in which the undercompensation for users of home
care in year t-1 is completely eliminated decreases the R-
squared by only 0.3 percentage points. Thus, in terms of the
R-squared, the costs of the constraint appear to be very low.
In terms of the CPM (not bound to fall in a ‘‘least-squares’’
regression) the constrained model even leads to better fit
than the base model, though the actual improvement is
relatively minor.
To assess group-level fit, Fig. 1 presents results for the
sets of included and omitted groups. The capital letters H
and P represent the undercompensation in year t for users
of home care and physiotherapy in year t-1, respectively.
By design, the undercompensation for users of home care
in year t-1 is smaller for the constrained models than for
the base model. More interesting is the reduction of
undercompensation for users of physiotherapy in year t-1,
showing that reducing undercompensation for one omitted
group can also improve compensation for another omitted
group. Apparently, certain risk indicators in the RE model
Table 3 Results (euros, 2012) for the base model and for ten single-
constraint models
R-squared
(9100%)
CPM
(9100%)
Base model 22.5% 24.8%
Base model ? single constraint to limit
undercompensation for users of home
care in t-1 by:
20% 22.5% 24.9%
40% 22.5% 24.9%
60% 22.4% 24.9%
80% 22.3% 24.9%
100% 22.2% 24.8%
Base model ? single constraint to limit
undercompensation for users of
physiotherapy in t-1 by:
20% 22.5% 24.9%
40% 22.5% 25.0%
60% 22.4% 25.0%
80% 22.2% 25.0%
100% 22.0% 24.8%
27 R-squared is computed as 1
Pn
i¼1ðYiY^iÞ
2
Pn
i¼1ðYi YÞ
2. CPM is computed as
1
Pn
i¼1 jYiY^ijPn
i¼1 jYi Yj
.
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are positively correlated with both the home care group and
the physiotherapy group. When weights on these risk
indicators are altered by the constraint, undercompensation
for the physiotherapy group is reduced as well.
Figure 1 also shows that, as expected, the constraint for
the omitted group introduces over- and undercompensation
for the group indicators included in the RE model. The
small numbers represent the overcompensation for the 15
DCGs while the large ‘‘0’’ represents the undercompensa-
tion for those without a DCG. For the latter group the
constrained models introduce an undercompensation up to
40 euros per person per year; for the DCGs the models with
constraints introduce overcompensation up to 1280 euros
per person per year. The direction of these under- and
overcompensations can be explained by the positive cor-
relation between the omitted groups and the DCGs: since
the home care and physiotherapy groups have relatively
high proportions of people in a DCG (not shown here), the
constrained model overcompensates the DCGs in order to
move funds to these omitted groups.28 Like the reduction in
undercompensation for users of home care, the change in
under- or overcompensation for the other groups in Fig. 1
is also linear, a consequence of constrained least-squares
estimators with linear constraints.29
Figure 2 reports the analogous results for the base model
supplemented with a series of single constraints reducing
the undercompensation for users of physiotherapy in the
previous year. Patterns are similar to those in Fig. 1, with
the difference that the constraint regarding physiotherapy
leads to bigger changes in under- or overcompensation for
other groups (both the included groups and the other
omitted group).
Introduction of a constraint involves a trade-off between
a reduction of undercompensation for omitted groups and
an increase in under- or overcompensation for the included
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Fig. 1 Results (euros, 2012) for the base model (N = 16.5 m) and for the same model supplemented with a single constraint to reduce
undercompensation in year t for users of home care in t-1
28 Payment weights patterns under a constrained regression are
consistent with the finding in Glazer and McGuire [12] that optimal
risk adjusted weights should reflect the correlation between indicators
part of the risk equalization and omitted factors affecting health care
expenses.
29 This can be shown by writing out the formula for the estimated
coefficients in constrained least squares. Suppose we seek to estimate
a vector b of regression coefficients on j variables X subject to q linear
constraints of the form QT where Q is a j 9 q matrix of full rank and
the superscript T indicates the transpose of a matrix. Y is a q 9 1
vector of constants. One of these q equations could be interpreted in
our context as a constraint that the average payment for a target group
is equal to an amount ‘‘y.’’ The constrained estimator is b^c ¼
b^ XTXð Þ1 Q QT XTXð Þ1Q
 1
ðQTb^ yÞ. From this it is clear that
db^c=dy is constant.
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ones. When it comes to incentives for risk selection,
however, it is not only the under- or overcompensation that
matters, but also the size of the affected group. Figure 3
combines these two aspects, showing selected results for
three of the RE models from Figs. 1 and 2. The height of
the bars indicates the average under- or overcompensation
for a group and the width indicates the relative size of the
group. The product of height and width, as represented by
the area of the bars, indicates the total under- or over-
compensation for a group. The right side of panel A shows
the undercompensation for the two omitted indicators in
the base model. The left side of the panels tracks the
overcompensation for the larger of the included groups
(DCGs with at least 1% of the population included). With
no constraint, least-squares estimators eliminate over- or
undercompensation in the base model for the included
groups. Panel B shows results for the restriction of reduc-
ing the undercompensation for the home care group by
80% compared to the base model. Undercompensation for
both omitted groups falls, as was reported in Fig. 1, and
overcompensation appears for the DCGs shown in the
Figure. Panel C shows the same set of results for one of the
models in Fig. 2. Overall, Fig. 3 illustrates that constrain-
ing undercompensation for one omitted group pushes funds
towards that specific group as well as to the other omitted
group, and to ‘‘sick people’’ in general, at least as indicated
by a DCG. For the DCGs in Fig. 3 this appears as an
overcompensation for members of these groups.
Though the group results in Figs. 1, 2 and 3 are infor-
mative, they cannot evaluate trade-offs between the
improvement for omitted groups and the worsening for
included groups. As argued in Section ‘‘Theory and con-
cepts’’ of this paper, evaluating the trade-off can be based
on a mutually exclusive grouping of individuals and a
weighting of under- and overcompensation, as is done by
our summary measure proposed in Section ‘‘Theory and
concepts’’. The essence of the summary measure in (1) is
that weighted under- or overcompensations are computed
and aggregated for mutually exclusive groups.
Figure 4 illustrates application of our summary measure
to the base model and to the same model with a single
constraint for reducing the undercompensation for the
home care group. The measure is computed according to
formula (1) with p = 2, separately for two sets of groups:
the four combinations of yes/no home care use and yes/no
physiotherapy use in the previous year (solid line) and the
16 DCG-groups (dotted line). In the case of p = 2, we refer
to our measure as the weighted mean squared deviation
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Fig. 2 Results (euros, 2012) for the base model (N = 16.5 m) and for the same model supplemented with a single constraint to reduce
undercompensation in year t for users of physiotherapy in t-1
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(WMSD). The results clearly show the trade-off between
the improvement for the omitted groups and the deterio-
ration for included groups.
Whereas Fig. 4 illustrates application of the measure
separately for omitted and included groups, Fig. 5 inte-
grates the selection incentives on omitted and included
groups in a single measure. As in Fig. 4, the measure is
calculated according to formula (1) with p = 2, but this
time for all 64 mutually exclusive combinations of the four
omitted and 16 included groups. Up to an 80% reduction in
undercompensation for home care, the constraint reduces
the WMSD, but further tightening the restriction for the
omitted group increases the WMSD because of deteriora-
tion in the fit of compensation for the included groups.
Based on these results we conclude that for mutually
exclusive combinations of the selected included and
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Fig. 3 Over- and undercompensation in year t in three models (N = 16.5 m)
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omitted groups studied in this paper, a well-chosen con-
strained model can outperform the base model.
To check sensitivity of our results to different
assumptions about the weighting of under- and over-
compensations, we calculated the summary measure (as
presented in Fig. 5) for values of p ranging from 1.0 to
2.0. Figure 6 displays the normalized values of weighted
mean absolute deviations (WMAD, a more general term
to describe our measure for values of p other than 2.0) for
the end points of 1.0 and 2.0. These are normalized so
that the WMAD for each set of model comparisons is set
at 100 for the base model. The pattern is similar for
p = 1 and p = 2 (also for the intermediate values of
p not shown). In panel A, the measure falls as under-
compensation is reduced for users of home care, but after
some point in the 60–80% reduction range, it goes up.
The findings for reducing undercompensation for users of
physiotherapy shown in panel B are similar. For both
weights of the over- and undercompensation, although the
exact minimum varies slightly, the same U-shape
describes the results. Thus, our finding that a moderate
reduction in undercompensation minimizes our measure is
insensitive to reasonable weights for the absolute value of
the over- and undercompensation.
The results presented above clearly show that for a
mutually exclusive set of the selected included and omitted
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indicators, a single-constraint model can outperform the
base model. A natural next question is whether adding a
second constraint to the model can lead to further
improvements. To check this in our case we started with
the most effective single constraint for home care accord-
ing to our summary measure with p = 2: reducing the
undercompensation for home care by 80%. (This is the
minimum of the U-shaped dotted line corresponding to
p = 2 from Fig. 6a). We introduced the additional con-
straint that the undercompensation for physiotherapy
should be reduced by 20% from the base model, and then
should be reduced by 40%. The value of the summary
measure (the WMSD) fell by slightly more than 1% of its
value with the first constraint at a target undercompensa-
tion for physiotherapy of 20% less, but then went up as the
second constraint was tightened to the 40% drop in
undercompensation. While the improvement obtained by
introducing the second constraint is considerably less when
the first constraint is roughly optimized, the results show
that in terms of the summary measure applied here, a two-
constraint model can outperform a single-constraint model.
Compared to OLS, constrained regressions inherently
increase under/overcompensation for groups explicitly
recognized in the RE model. At the same time, they can
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reduce under/overcompensation for groups omitted from
the RE model but explicitly recognized in the constraints.
The effect of constrained regression on other omitted
groups, however, is less obvious. To gain insight in this
effect we examined the consequences of constraints for
modifying undercompensation for home care and physio-
therapy users on a series of groups identified by health
survey information. As described in the data section, the
small sample size (N = 14,310) implies that under- or
overcompensations for groups can be vulnerable to random
variation. Figure 7 shows results for the ten groups for
which the initial under- or overcompensation by the base
model is statistically significant (p B 0.05).30 The results
are striking: a single constraint for reducing the under-
compensation for users of home care (or for users of
physiotherapy) in the previous year can also substantially
reduce under- or overcompensation for other omitted
groups. Apparently, certain risk indicators in the RE model
are correlated with both the home care (physiotherapy)
group and the groups presented in Fig. 7. When weights on
these risk indicators are altered by the constraint, this
reduces under- or overcompensation for the groups in
Fig. 7 as well.
For example, consider the group on the left-hand side of
Fig. 7, those reporting their health status to be in the lowest
three categories: bad, poor or moderate, composing 19% of
the population. These people are undercompensated by an
average of 331 euros in the base model. If we impose the
constraint eliminating the undercompensation for home
care, the undercompensation for the bad-poor-moderates
falls to 118 euros, and if we impose instead the constraint
that we eliminate the undercompensation for physiother-
apy, the undercompensation disappears altogether (to only
8 euros). Remarkably, for all eight of the undercompen-
sated groups, imposing either constraint has a meaningful
favorable impact on the undercompensation. The con-
straints also improve payments for the groups that were
overcompensated, as shown on the right-hand side of
Fig. 7. The 67% of the population with no chronic illness
were overcompensated by 116 euros in the base model, and
this is cut to 32 with the home care constraint imposed and
16 if the physiotherapy constraint is imposed.
The findings in Fig. 7 have two important implications.
First, the observation that under- and overcompensations
for the groups in the figure change substantially as a result
of a constraint implies that an appropriate trade-off
between the benefits and costs of a constraint requires
involving all groups of interest. This emphasizes the
importance of the questions raised in Sect. ‘‘Theory and
concepts’’, i.e., ‘‘Which groups are relevant in terms of risk
selection actions?’’ and ‘‘What is the relative importance of
under- and overcompensation for these groups?’’ Second,
the direction of the changes in under- and
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30 The test is a two-sided t-test that the difference between payment
and cost for individuals in each group equals zero.
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overcompensation in Fig. 7 implies that the benefits of
constrained regression may reach far: a single constraint
intended to improve payment fit for one relevant omitted
group can lead to an improvement for many others.
Discussion
The natural way to improve RE models for particular
groups is to add new/better risk adjustor variables indi-
cating membership in these groups. But what if appropriate
risk adjustor variables are not (yet) available? For these
situations, this paper proposed constraining the estimation
coefficients of the RE model in order to reduce the under-
or overcompensation of the group(s) of interest to a fixed
amount. Compared to OLS, constraints reduce model fit in
terms of R-squared. Our empirical application of con-
strained regression to the Dutch RE model of 2015, how-
ever, shows that the magnitude of this reduction may be
small. An alternative fit measure, the Cummings prediction
measure (CPM) also changes little with the introduction of
the constraints considered here. On the basis of our results,
an R-squared or CPM should be supplemented with other
measures when evaluating constrained regression models,
since R-squared and CPM appear to be insensitive to
changes in group-level fit induced by the introduction of
the constraints considered here.
At a group level, a constraint limiting under- or over-
compensation for an omitted group comes at the cost of
introducing under- or overcompensation for included
groups. To illustrate our proposed method, we have chosen
potentially relevant groups to study and selected a general
summary measure to quantify the trade-offs involved. With
these assumptions, we find that the improvement for
omitted groups can outweigh the deterioration for included
groups. Moreover, multiple constraints can reduce selec-
tion incentives over a single constraint. Although we study
a particular application of constrained regressions, we have
no reason to think these findings are special to this
empirical setting. If an indicator for an omitted group of
interest is correlated with variables already included in the
RE model, it should generally be possible to introduce at
least a modest constraint that makes first-order cuts in
undercompensation for the group with the omitted indica-
tor at the cost of only ‘‘marginal’’ over/undercompensation
for groups based on included indicators. It will be worth-
while to investigate the conditions (if they exist) under
which introduction of a constraint at the margin is associ-
ated with a model improvement, perhaps using envelope-
theorem type arguments. In any case, the practical perfor-
mance of constraints in a particular plan payment appli-
cation is straightforward to assess systematically for each
setting.
This paper is intended to be a ‘‘proof of concept.’’
Ultimately, to be useful in terms of plan payment redesign,
application of constrained regression methods requires
stipulating the groups that can be a target of selection
actions and valuing the under- or overcompensation for
these groups. This exercise starts with identifying the
possible selection-related actions in a certain context. For
example, when insurers might discriminate on the basis of
‘‘yes/no use of home care in the prior year’’, these are the
two relevant groups to distinguish. When insurers are able
to discriminate on the basis of combinations of ‘‘yes/no use
of home care in the prior year’’ and ‘‘yes/no inclusion in
any DCG’’, these are the four relevant groups to distin-
guish, and so on.31 A mismatch between the (potential)
selection targets and the groups distinguished in the sum-
mary measure may result in misleading outcomes. So,
compared to standard measures used for evaluation of risk
equalization models — such as the R-squared, CPM and
predictive ratios — our summary measure is more complex
since it requires information about (potential) selection
actions in a certain context (as a basis for stipulating the
relevant groups) and the effects of these actions (as a basis
for valuing the under- and overcompensations for these
groups). When it comes to selection incentives, however,
our measure is also more meaningful.
We believe our approach offers an opportunity to
expand the role of regulators and public policy makers.
Rather than being reactive to problems identified in
empirical studies of RE models, regulators can be proactive
and take steps to define the objectives that will be maxi-
mized by RE model estimation. Further research is clearly
necessary to find a process by which a social consensus can
be reached about defining groups of concern for protection
against incentives for selection. Once consensus has been
reached, however, the ‘‘objective’’ of a RE model can be
quantified in the form of a measure like the one used in this
paper. Optimization of an explicit objective function with
respect to payment weights on included indicators implies
a new way for estimating parameters of a RE model. We
regard this to be an important area for ongoing research on
selection incentives and risk equalization.
31 This can be illustrated with the outcomes of the model that
constrains the estimated coefficients such that the average undercom-
pensation for people with use of home care in the prior year equals
zero. While for the entire group of people with use of home care in the
prior year the average undercompensation indeed equals zero (see
Fig. 1), this is not the case for subsets of this group on the basis of
‘‘yes/no inclusion in any DCG’’: those without a DCG (1.7% of the
population) are undercompensated by 41 euros while those with a
DCG (1.0% of the population) are overcompensated by 65 euros (not
shown in Tables and Figures). This implies that evaluation of
incentives for selection under a certain risk equalization model
requires knowledge about the level at which selection (potentially)
takes place.
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